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In 2016 the democratic world experienced two major shocks. Although support for illiberal 
nationalism has been on the rise for at least a decade, the events of that year, starting with the 
narrow victory of the Leave campaign in the United Kingdom’s 23 June referendum on its 
membership in the European Union (EU), followed less than six months later by Donald J. 
Trump’s election as President of the United States on 8 November, constituted a clear break. In 
contrast to the postwar liberal democratic, which legitimized itself through the provision of 
welfare benefits and effective management of competing interests, these two developments 
signalled seemingly a return to the more rough-and-tumble, unstable politics of the interwar 
period. 
In their aftermath, political commentators and scholars of democracy rushed to pinpoint 
their causes. Numerous analyses pointed out that both Brexit and Trump’s election in the US 
built on a deeper dissatisfaction with the postwar democratic consensus that had been building 
for quite some time. Given their profound effects on the everyday life of citizens across the West 
– as well as the growing inequalities that it revealed – most of these explanations focused on the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed in its wake. While debates 
continue on whether economic or cultural factors are to blame, there is broad agreement that the 
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rise of anti-systemic, anti-status quo movements were the result of legitimate grievances among 
the citizens of Western democracies that had been building for some time.1 
This diagnosis has given rise to two basic sets of responses. The first focuses on the 
phenomenon of populism, seeking to differentiate beneficial attempts to give voice to the people, 
and more dangerous, authoritarian movements.2 Working in parallel to this literature, a second 
strand approaches these issues in institutional and policy terms, focusing on innovations that 
might prevent anti-systemic parties from taking political power and outlining interventions to 
address the concerns of the increasingly impoverished, fragmented populations of the West.3 
To date this research has been dominated by social scientists applying their models to 
current events. Recently, however, historians have started to weigh in as well. Writing from the 
European continetal perspective, Martin Conway’s Western Europe’s Democratic Age and Till 
van Rahden’s Democracy: An Endangered Way of Life, are exemplary of this new scholarship.4 
Both respond to the ongoing crisis of democracy by placing contemporary events within a 
broader timeline in order “to make the emergence of democracy in post-1945 Western Europe 
appear more historically complex, and also more open-ended” (MC, 20). Unlike previous 
approaches, they eschew judgements about the desirability of populism as well as questions of 
policy and institutional structure. Instead, by exploring what Conway refers to as “the social 
                                                        
1 See Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic have-Nots and 
Cultural Backlash," Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series (August, 2016). 
2 For example, Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2019); Jason Stanley, How Fascism Works: 
The Politics of Us and them (New York: Random House, 2018); Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? 
(Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2016); Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 
(New York: Crown, 2018). 
3  Yascha Mounk, The People Vs. Democracy: Why our Freedom is in Danger and how to Save it (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2018); Sheri Berman, "The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism," Journal of 
Democracy 28, no. 3 (2017). 
4 Citations to both of these works appear parenthetically. When necessary to avoid ambiguity, citations to Conway 
will be marked MC and to van Rahden TvR. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from van Rahden’s original 
German to English are mine. 
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textures of postwar Europe” (25), they both “explore what Till van Rahden…has termed 
‘democracy as a way of life’” (24).5 
The commonalities between these two works go even further. In historicizing the postwar 
experience of democracy in Western Europe, both focus on the immediate postwar years. 
Additionally, they also identify the “trench warfare (Grabenkämpfe)” (29, 41) of 1968 as the key 
turning point that marks the end of Western Europe’s postwar democratic age.6 More 
specifically, Conway and van Rahden argue that the student protests calling for more 
participation in politics and the greater democratization of society ended the consensus that 
supported the elitist, technocratic regimes – famously labelled “electoral monarchies” by Jürgen 
Habermas, who both authors cite (MC, 89; TvR, 59) – that defined democracy immediately 
following the end of the Second World War.7 
By drawing our attention to the more distant past, van Rahden and Conway remind us that 
liberal democracy is not “the origin and end of history” (23), nor is it “the political regime to 
which states revert when the specific conditions that generate anti-democratic alternatives abate” 
(18). Rather than focusing on populists – “or, perhaps more accurately, on those who had very 
different understandings of democracy” (MC, 18) – or examining “how democracies die,” both 
of these historians instead are concerned with “what keeps them alive” (TvR, 9). 
Methodologically, they care less about democracy as a regime, idea or concept, preferring focus 
on the actions that constitute democratic practice. In this sense, Conway and van Rahden prefer 
to use the adjectival construction to the substantive, the democratic to democracy. Their shared 
                                                        
5  Till van Rahden, "Clumsy Democrats: Moral Passions in the Federal Republic," German History 29, no. 3 (2011). 
6 In an earlier piece, Conway dated the fall to 1973. Martin Conway, "The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's 
Democratic Age, 1945–1973," Contemporary European History 13, no. 1 (2004).  
7  Jürgen Habermas, "Die Bundesrepublik: eine Wahlmonarchie?" Magnum (1961). 
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emphasis is therefore on “how fragile and endangered [the democratic] social order is” (TvR, 
23), rather than on democracy in the abstract.  
These two works merit comparison because of their differences as well. Whilst Conway 
focuses on the democratization of postwar Europe as a transnational “phenomenon that 
transcended nation-state frontiers” (21), van Rahden narrows his gaze by telling “an alternate 
history of the Federal Republic of Germany” (23). Similarly, whereas the former builds primarily 
on secondary literature, the latter draws on stories and anecdotes culled from popular newspapers 
and tabloids. Finally, while Conway’s project is inspired by Raymond Aron, van Rahden is more 
capacious, drawing not only on German thinkers such as Siegfried Kracauer, but also on 
international intellectuals, most notably Sidney Hook. 
 
The Loss of Postwar Democratic Stability 
Although Conway’s study is motivated by what he refers to as “the present-day sense of crisis” 
(ix), it is inspired by Aron’s real-time reflections on the state of democracy in postwar Europe. 
More specifically, the book seeks to “take seriously Aron’s thesis of a democratic stabilization of 
Western Europe” (10), which the French political philosopher first presented at the Congress of 
Cultural Freedom in West Berlin in 1960. In his speech Aron argued that the surprisingly stable 
and uniform democratic regimes that had established themselves across Western Europe over the 
previous decade and a half signaled that the continent had finally reached a certain stage of 
political maturity. This was visible in the fact that the ideological arguments that had dominated 
the era before 1945 had been abandoned in favor of a liberal democratic model guaranteeing 
both liberal, individual rights and popular sovereignty channeled through representative 
institutions. Instead of making unrealistic, pie-in-the-sky promises, Aron praised these new 
democratic regimes for legitimating themselves through the provision of economic growth, 
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effective state-based policy-making and the resolution of social conflict via negotiation and 
compromise.8 
Although the democratic stabilization of Western Europe was an important development, 
Conway points out that the postwar years ultimately represent “a missed moment of radical 
change” (36). At the societal level, the postwar desire for normality meant that gender 
hierarchies were quickly reestablished as women, who had been able to take on roles previously 
reserved for men during the war, were quickly pushed back into their traditional gender roles. 
Similarly, although elections became crucial markers of identity, politics remained an affair of 
the elites. As a result – in Aron’s words – democratic practice was reduced to “a secondary 
activity which is mainly the business of professionals.”9 Rather than representing opportunities 
for fundamental change, elections became “ritualized events” in which turnout was “celebrated 
more than the outcome” (114). 
While there can be little doubt that the regimes that were established across Western 
Europe at this time were democracies, they represented a “[r]estoration, rather than revolution” 
(50). In making this argument, Conway seeks to undermine the Panglossian picture of this period 
in the popular imaginary today. He works particularly hard to destroy the myth of the “economic 
miracle” or “glorious thirty” years between 1945 and 1975. In contrast to contemporary 
portrayals of this as the golden age of democratic capitalism, Conway argues that the prosperity 
of this period was “neither universal nor emphatic” as “[i]nequalities between regions, economic 
sectors, and social classes… creat[ed] an enduring sense of winners and losers.”10 He concludes 
                                                        
8 Raymond Aron, "The Situation of Democracy: Western Political Institutions in the Twentieth Century," Daedalus 
90, no. 2 (1961). 
9  Ibid., 361. 
10 See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic 
Capitalism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 2014). 
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that this period’s “most significant impact was therefore more psychological than material” 
(248), and that it – and the postwar democratic age more generally – “proved to be something of 
a half-victory for workers” (235). 
Far from representing an era to which we should want to return to today, Conway instead 
focuses on the flaws and the undesirable elements of the postwar consensus. In particular, he is 
critical of its elitist, bourgeois character, which he describes throughout the text using different 
adjectives to modify the concept of democracy, including “audience” (302), “formal” (8), 
“management” (263), “consensual” (12) and “controlled” (88). While he argues that the postwar 
“allegiance of the conservative right and the socialist left to democratic procedures” helped to 
stabilize democratic rule by granting it an air of legitimacy, Conway makes it clear that this is 
hardly an era that we should look back on fondly.11  
This narrative has much to recommend it, as I hope this brief summary has shown. In 
particular, Conway’s attempt to brush away the overly idealistic patina with which this period is 
viewed today is well-taken. That said, I am skeptical of his attempt to downplay the importance 
of 1945 and the role that the experience of the Third Reich – as well as the crisis of the interwar 
years and of two world wars more generally – played in the democratic stabilization of Western 
Europe after the end of the Second World War. While I am sympathetic to this attempt to show 
that democracy in postwar Western Europe was not an inevitable product of the reaction against 
the suffering and atrocities of Europe’s “age of total war,” Conway goes too far in not 
considering the effects that lived experience and these vivid memories of the recent past played 
in the politics of postwar Europe. For example, in making his argument Conway correctly points 
out that although the postwar era did bring a number of new political leaders to the fore, this did 
                                                        
11  Aron, "Situation of Democracy," 360. 
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not lead to a broader change in the political class as “the leaders of post-war Europe were not so 
much new men, as new faces drawn from within those same milieux” (44). 
Unfortunately, in his rush to make this point he fails to note the important ways in which 
the members of the interwar political establishment who took the reins of power after the war – 
including figures such as Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Alcide De Gasperi – were 
changed by their experience of Nazism and the Second World War. In seeking to provide a new 
form of “stable parliamentarism and effective government” (17) based on political negotiation 
and the protection of human rights, these leaders were drawing directly on their personal 
memories of the recent past. The lessons they drew from the failures of the interwar years are 
crucial not only in explaining the surprisingly similar democratic regimes they created 
domestically after 1945, but also to the foundation of European integration, which sought to 
preserve these lessons at a supranational level.12  
The fact that Conway cannot avoid admitting that the democratic regimes of this period 
were “embedded in a complex and highly contested past” (17), even though this point does not 
fit into the framework of this broader argument, along with the short shrift he gives to pressures 
from the US and the geopolitical factors that shaped developments in Western Europe in the 
decades immediately following the end of the war, are significant lacunae in his narrative. These 
oversights are unfortunate, as more attention to collective memory might have helped Conway to 
better explain how and why 1968 brought an end to the postwar democratic consensus.13 For 
example, as it stands the book presents the revolts of 1968 as a surprising development given the 
                                                        
12  Peter J. Verovšek, Memory and the Future of Europe: Memory and Integration in the Wake of Total War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020). 
13  Peter J. Verovšek, "Memory, Narrative, and Rupture: The Power of the Past as a Resource for Political Change," 
Memory Studies 13, no. 4 (2020); Peter J. Verovšek, "Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: 
The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm," Politics, Groups, and Identities 4, no. 3 (2016). 
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“often bewilderingly diverse range of issues” (256) it raised. Unable to explain its timing, 
Conway follows Aron in blaming the spread of “le virus révolutionnaire” on what he 
inadequately describes as “a series of accidents” (261). 
Although he is right to note that the debates of that decade were “rooted in a perceived 
need to come to terms with that past” (258), Conway fails to connect this insight to the 
generational dynamics of memory at play in these developments. Most notably, in contrast to 
previous generations, whose political sensitivities were defined the experience of two world 
wars, the protesting students were driven instead by the incomplete democratization of political 
and social life after 1945. As a result, their attention was focused not on the need to provide 
stability and welfare, but on the failures of postwar democracy. Supported by a slightly older set 
of intellectuals like Habermas, who had come of age during the war and thus bore no 
responsibility for it, the students were thus able to question the achievements of postwar 
democracy precisely because of their generational positions.14 
Although Conway sets out to prove Aron’s 1960 thesis of democratic stabilization, he 
argues that the more pessimistic assessment of these démocraties stabilisées or pacifiées that the 
French philosopher offered in his 1977 Plaidoyer pour l’Europe décadente are more relevant to 
the present. Reflecting back on his speech at the Congress of Cultural Freedom, Conway view of 
Aron, which does not jive with Aron’s own conclusions, is that the French political theorist’s 
confident assessment of Europe’s democratic maturity had been based “far too exclusively on the 
experiences of a white, educated bourgeoisie who were the principal beneficiaries of post-war 
economic and social change” (7). While Aron, and by extension Conway, remain critical of what 
they perceive as the post-1968 abandonment of the liberal values that animated Europe’s brief 
                                                        
14  A. Dirk Moses, "The Forty-Fivers: A Generation between Fascism and Democracy," German Politics & Society 
17, no. 1 (1999). 
 9 
postwar democratic age, they both also recognize the flaws of a democratic society that operates 
“without transports of enthusiasm or indignation” (Aron quoted on 9). Ultimately, Conway 
concludes that “[a]ll democracies are incomplete” and that there is nothing to “suggest that the 
current model of democratic politics will mark the end point in its evolution” (310). 
 
The Family and the Democratic Way of Life 
In contrast to Conway’s large, big picture, historicizing narrative of Western Europe’s postwar 
democratic age, van Rahden’s argument is much narrower, focusing on “the particular facets of 
German history since the so-called ‘Zero Hour’ (Stunde Null)” (54). Like the former, the latter is 
also interested in democracy as a “way of life” (Lebensform) rather than as an institutional 
regime or a political concept. However, in contrast to his English counterpart van Rahden treats 
society as a Matryoshka doll, with the democratic family at its core. He therefore seeks to answer 
the question of “how democracy maintains its shape (Fassung)” by focusing on the “ethos, 
manners, or mœurs that it presupposes“ (10, italics and foreign words in original). 
Drawing his inspiration from Hook, van Rahden argues that like the family, a democracy 
is a community created by a group of different individuals, who succeed in developing “forms 
and conventions, rules and procedures that enable us to live with moral conflicts that we cannot  
resolve but can only endure” (21). In approaching his subject in this way, each chapter focuses 
on a small detail from the history of the Federal Republic, ranging from the smile of a justice on 
the constitutional court and a young father in a baby care course to the afterlife of a communal 
swimming pool. Much like Conway, but using an admittedly more “eclectic approach,” he also 
hopes to shake the existing literature out of its teleological assumptions by “opening up a view of 
a historical reality full of contradictions and aporias” (23). 
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In thinking about the family as the core of democratic life, van Rahden divides the history 
of the Federal Republic into three phases: the pre-democratic occupation of the immediate 
postwar years, the blooming of democracy in the 1950s and 1960s after the foundation of the 
Federal Republic in 1949, and its subsequent delegitimation by calls for the “democratization of 
democracy” in 1968. Like Conway, van Rahden also opposes the idea that 1945 formed a clear 
break from everything that came before; unlike Conway, however, he deals extensively with the 
legacy of the Nazi period and its continuing effects on postwar West Germany. 
In addressing the immediate postwar years, van Rahden is especially sensitive to the 
views and reactions of German émigrés upon their return to the country after the war, 
particularly the emptiness that these exiles identified in their countrymen. For example, upon his 
return Kracauer described the German people as “formless,” “not so much human beings as raw 
material for human beings,” who were unable to communicate except through what he describes 
as “stilted language” (quoted on p. 63, italics and English in original). Similarly, the historian of 
art Julius Posener, who returned to his homeland in 1945 as a British intelligence officer, noted, 
“The great majority of the people has received a moral shock…which causes them to shout: Es 
war alles falsch, all-les falsch!!!!!’” [‘It was all wrong, aa-all wrong’] (31). 
This diagnosis leads van Rahden to oppose interpretations of the National Socialism – as 
well as Stalinism and fascism more generally – as amoral orders. On the contrary, he argues that 
these “ways of life” built on deep-seated moral convictions, at least for their supporters. Despite 
the “banal desire for normality” (55), which the Germans shared with their fellow Europeans, 
van Rahden argues that it is only possible to understand how they came to accept democracy by 
tracing confronting the moral challenge of Nazism. More specifically, he notes that telling this 
“moral history” (Moralgeschichte) requires a focus on “the connection between the democratic 
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order and private ways of life” (66), which comes to the fore “in times of revolutionary upheaval 
and political change” (67). 
After allowing West Germany to sleepwalk through the immediate postwar years, the US, 
UK and France forced the population of their occupied zones to accept democratic institutions 
through the imposition of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the Federal Republic’s provisional 
postwar constitution. Despite its political implications, van Rahden observes that debates about 
democracy were primarily channeled through questions relating to family life, focusing in 
particular on what a “democratic family” should look like. These discussions were not confined 
to west German academic elites, who were obsessed by questions of childhood development 
during this period, but extended across the political and social spectrum, from right to left, high- 
to low-brow. Given the “manly” ideals of virility promoted by the Nazis, these appeals focused 
in particular on the father, who was encouraged to abandon the archetype of the dictatorial 
paterfamilias, in favor of a more caring, tender role that – in the words of Walter Becker – relied 
on “the child’s deep trust in the authority figure” (quoted on 96). 
The new ideal of the democratic family was not contained solely in prosaic examples, 
such as the image of the young father in a baby care course. It was also echoed in legal debates, 
particularly the 1959 decision by the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, which dethroned the 
father as the unassailable head of the family by ruling that in the eyes of the law “the relationship 
of both parents to their children is essentially equal” (quoted on 70). Given its importance for 
family relations in the Federal Republic – and its global resonance at the time – van Rahden 
presents this verdict as the ultimate signal of “the improbable renaissance of a democratic culture 
in the society of postwar West Germany” (80). According to a report in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine äeitung, the only female justice on the court, Erna Scheffler, delivered this verdict 
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with “a smile” (einem Lächeln), thus providing van Rahden with another paradigmatic image of 
the democratic way of life. 
Much like Conway, van Rahden also focuses on 1968 as a key break in the new postwar 
democratic order. However, unlike his English counterpart, who repeatedly bemoans the fact that 
the student protests “lacked a unifying ideology” and “remained obstinately plural and diffuse” 
(257), van Rahden argues that the anti-authoritarian movements of this period were unified by 
the fact that they no longer saw the family as “a place of democratic learning, but rather as a 
haven of repression and an obstacle to the search for a democratic order” (108). Whereas the 
previous period had been unified by a search for democracy rooted in household relations and 
proper forms of domestic authority, the protests of 1968 destroyed this societal consensus by 
arguing against all forms of authority, as well as against the family as such. This constituted a 
clear “rupture” (Zäsur, 107) in West German democratic life.  
This search for a “repression-free upbringing” (represionslosen Erziehung, 112) led the 
protesters of 1968 to focus on nurseries and kindergartens, as well as communes and new forms 
of sexual relations, in order to create “a world without the family,” as the title of chapter four 
puts it. Interestingly, and similar to the previous two periods, this break with the idea of the 
democratic family spread across the social and political spectrum. Van Rahden notes that these 
experiments in living not only received favorable coverage in the mainstream media, such as Die 
Zeit and Der Spiegel; surprisingly, “even Catholic press outlets did not entirely reject the idea of 
a world without families” (121). 
This focus on family life as the core of the increasingly threatened democratic way of life 
opens a number of new perspectives on how we think about both Western Europe’s postwar 
democratic age and the crisis of democracy in the first decades of the twenty-first century. 
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Despite their idiosyncrasy, van Rahden does a good job of connecting his small anecdotes and 
stories to broader societal debates. His protestations that his claims build primarily on the 
quotidian discourse of the popular media, rather than “relying on prominent intellectuals such as 
Dolf Sternberger or Ralf Dahrendorf, Wilhelm Hennis or Jürgen Habermas” (27), 
notwithstanding, van Rahden repeatedly returns to these theorists of democracy as he generalizes 
on the basis of images like the smile of the constitutional court justice or the image of the young 
father in a child-care course. 
It is less clear where the book leaves us or how it is supposed to help us to better 
comprehend our present. In reflecting back on his narrative of the flourishing of a democratic 
way of life in the 1950s and its collapse in 1968, van Rahden notes that “it becomes clear how 
alien both eras have become to us.” Despite the pluralization of family life and the new 
“experiments in living” (Foucault) enabled by more recent developments, including feminism 
and the movement for LGBTQ rights, he argues that what has been lost is the “cross-party and 
cross-societal belief that the survival of democracy depends on a specific style of upbringing, be 
it in the family, be it outside the family in municipalities, nurseries or shared apartments” (124).  
 There may be something to the idea that the lack of a shared societal discourse around the 
proper forms of private life lies at the root of our public malaise today. It is possible that the 
contemporary fragmentation of society, as well as the loss of community reflected in our 
increasing apathy towards those around us, so clearly visible in the phenomenon of “bowling 
alone,” is rooted in the fact that private life has increasingly become ensconced in the sphere of 
intimacy, which is off limits for public debate.15 Indeed, it is hard to imagine how we can live 
together as a community – rather than as a mere aggregation of individuals located in the same 
                                                        
15  Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Touchstone 
Books, 2001). 
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place and time – without some shared ideas about what kinds of childrearing practices promote a 
democratic way of life. 
Rather than focusing on the implications of the lack of a unifying societal debate on the 
proper practices, role and place of the democratic family, the final chapter of van Rahden’s book 
instead addresses the destruction and legacy of a public swimming pool in the city of Offenbach, 
just outside Frankfurt am Main. The contrast between the inauguration of the Parkbad in 1961, 
which was widely celebrated both for its innovative design and for its creation of a new public 
space where citizens would encounter each other as equals, and its closure in 1992, when the 
increasingly indebted city was forced to tear it down in favor of a private luxury hotel, speaks for 
itself: “A symbol of the democratic awakening had thus become a symptom of the decline of 
public spaces” (136). 
This final example does a good job of highlighting how the loss of communal parks, 
playing fields, libraries and other publicly-owned places robs citizens of the spaces they need to 
foster a democratic way of life by engaging each other in informal interactions. Indeed, there is 
something to this, as there is some evidence to suggest that the austerity-induced sale of public 
properties by local governments has played a crucial role in driving support for populist parties 
and movements in recent years.16 In contrast to the dictates of contemporary neoliberal market 
fundamentalism, which holds that government must be as small and efficient as possible, van 
Rahden concludes that “the ‘leaner’ the state, the more endangered liberal democracy is.”  
While van Rahden is surely right that democracy, both as “a form of rule, but above all as 
a way of life, costs money” (139), this point sits somewhat awkwardly at the end of a study 
whose previous parts focus on the role of family life as the core and foundation of democracy. 
                                                        
16  Thiemo Fetzer, "Did Austerity Cause Brexit?" American Economic Review 109, no. 11 (2019), 3872. 
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Additionally, especially given the space that he devotes to examining the role of the father as 
both an authority and also a possible authoritarian figure, I was surprised not to see an 
engagement with the groundbreaking and increasingly salient postwar study on The 
Authoritarian Personality, conducted by members of the Frankfurt School during their exile in 
the US, which also argues that susceptibility to authoritarian appeals occurs early in the life of 
the child and is strongly influenced by the structure of the family.17 In contrast to the final 
chapter on the loss of public spaces – interesting as it is – I would have preferred to see some 
reflection on how more recent developments in family life, including rising rates of divorce and 
single parenthood, both of which are often driven by economic imperatives that put the 
traditional bourgeois family model out of the reach of many contemporary workers, affects 
democracy as a way of life today. 
 
The Return of Politics of Victory 
With the exception of the final chapter of van Rahden’s book – and despite their mutual desire to 
speak to the ongoing crisis of democracy in the first decades of the twenty-first century – both of 
these studies push the date of Western Europe’s postwar democratic age back further than the 
existing literature expressing the fear that we are living after or “post-democracy.”18 Rather than 
focusing on 2016 or 1989, which is usually seen as the end of the postwar era, Conway and van 
Rahden end their narratives before the onset of the oil shocks of the 1970s and the ensuing crisis 
of the welfare state that followed. This fifty year gap makes it somewhat more difficult to relate 
their findings to the present. 
                                                        
17 This study has recently been released in a new edition after being out of print for many years. See Theodor W. 
Adorno and others, The Authoritarian Personality (London: Verso, 2019). For a wonderful example of its new 
salience, see Peter E. Gordon, "The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump," 
Boundary 2 (15 June, 2016). 
18  Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). 
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With that being said, it is clear that the rise of neoliberalism and the starving of the state 
has something to do with the changes experienced by Western Europe’s democracies in the 
aftermath of the student protests. I have already noted how van Rahden makes this point using 
the example of the Parkbad in Offenbach in the conclusion of his study. Similarly, Conway 
observes in passing how the dirigiste “methods and mindsets of planning” that defined postwar 
politics meant that neoliberal notion of “[e]conomic freedom sat rather awkwardly within the 
culture of post-war democracy” (210). By contrast, he notes that the waning of parties and 
parliaments since 1970, accompanied by the rising influence of private enterprise, financial 
institutions, public-private partnerships and market forces more generally, means that “Power 
and democracy had diverged, generating an impotence common to both rulers and ruled” (302). 
As a diagnoses of the current crisis, both of these books echo many findings in the 
existing literature. However, reading their accounts against current trends brings some other 
implications to the fore as well. Although I do not wish to wade into the increasingly complex 
historical debates about the utility of comparisons of the present to Weimar, it is clear that 
stylistically today’s populists represent a return to the style of politics of the democratic regimes 
of the interwar years, which favored winner-take-all showdowns between “irresponsible political 
figures, who…sought to outbid each other, thereby fostering unrealistic expectations among the 
electors” (MC, 128).19 
As a reaction against the unstable parliamentarism of direct popular sovereignty promoted 
by the interwar regimes, Western Europe sought after 1945 to replace the “Darwinian struggles 
between conflicting interests by institutions of social negotiation” (139) with the “regulated 
                                                        
19  Examples of these comparative inquiries include Mark Mazower, "Weimar 2013?" Project Syndicate, 31 
December, 2013; Daniel Bessner and Udi Greenberg, "The Weimar Analogy," Jacobin Magazine (17 December, 
2016). 
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rivalry” (Burke, quoted in TvR 20) of democratic regimes in which “the citizens have to accept 
and agree to the rules of the game within which they seek to resolve their conflicts” (20). Over 
time, it is clear that citizens across the West have increasingly become fed up with what Conway 
calls the “process of continuous negotiation” demanded by liberal democracy. As collective 
memories of the instability, wars and suffering of the interwar years has faded, so has the postwar 
fear of a politics of direct popular sovereignty based not on compromise, but on “victory or defeat” 
(11).20 At a time when the institutions of representative democracy have increasingly been 
sidelined by anonymous market forces, it is perhaps understandable that disaffected citizens would 
seek to “take back control” – as the slogan of the Leave campaign in the UK so successfully put it 
– by abandoning the postwar approach of negotiation and technocratic problem solving, which 
increasingly seems to favor the haves over the have nots. 
This desire for clear victories, not compromise, is but one aspect of the contemporary 
malaise. The second is the return of the “cult of the great man” (128), visible in societies as 
disparate as the UK, the US, Brazil and Hungary, which was out of fashion for much of the 
postwar era. In contrast to the depersonalized politics of parliamentary committees and 
regulatory agencies, today’s disaffected citizens desire not impartiality, reflexivity and efficient 
management; instead, they want to feel that they are being heard.21 They therefore look to their 
leaders to give voice to their feelings and look on politics as a sport, where one plays to win, not 
to achieve some broader outcome. Victory is once again the overriding goal.  
The effects of this new politics of performance are clearly visible in the two countries that 
defined the democratic crisis of 2016. For example, in accepting the Republican nomination to 
                                                        
20  Peter J. Verovšek, "The Loss of European Memory," Social Europe Journal (12 February, 2019). 
21  Pierre Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011). 
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run for President in 2020 while standing on the south lawn of the White House, Donald Trump 
noted what was ultimately important: “We’re here, and they’re not.” Similarly, obtaining a 
narrow majority in favor of exiting the EU, the leaders of the Leave campaign in the 
Conservative party chose not to reunify the country by seeking a compromise in the form of a 
“soft Brexit,” but instead took full advantage of their victory to push for as clean a break with the 
EU as possible, even touting the advantages of “no deal.” This new winner-take-all mentality is 
particular dangerous when combined with winner-take-all votes, such as referenda and elections 
in first-past-the-post, single member districts, so it is perhaps not surprising that it has had the 
biggest effects precisely in the US and the UK in the case of Brexit. 
While it may be comforting to think we can return to the postwar democratic age simply 
by electing mainstream, status quo, liberal leaders, this is unlikely to be the case. Our time is 
different from the immediate postwar era in too many ways for the solution to be that simple. 
That being said, the resigned optimism with which Conway ends his book, declaring that 
“nothing would suggest that the current model of democratic politics will mark the end point in 
its evolution” (310), seems far too simplistic and overly passive a response to the perils of the 
contemporary moment.  
By contrast, van Rahden concludes, “We live in a democracy that is a form of rule and of 
life. It is up to us to maintain it” (141). This call to action is most welcome. Unfortunately, it is 
unclear what form it can and should take. That said, it is somewhat comforting to see individuals 
across the West increasingly taking to the streets to protest important issues that have been 
overlooked or exacerbated by contemporary political leaders. If Conway and van Rahden are 
correct in arguing that the protests of 1968 spelled the end of Western Europe’s postwar 
democratic age, it is possible that the new racial justice protests of 2020 might represent a new 
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beginning. At the very least, this seems like an outcome in which we may place our Kantian 
hopes (Hoffnungen). 
